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THE WISDOM OF SOFT JUDICIAL POWER: 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING 
Samuel Estreicher* 
Tristan Pelham-Webb** 
President Theodore Roosevelt believed in talking softly 
while carrying a big stick. 1 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who 
served on the Court from 1972 to 1987 after a distinguished ca-
reer in private practice, also talked softy but wielded a great deal 
of influence without using a stick, and sometimes just by agree-
ing with the majority. Branzburg v. Hayes is perhaps the clearest 
example. Writing for a five-person majority (that included Pow-
ell), Justice Byron White refused to create a First Amendment 
privilege for newsmen, rejecting the argument that the burden 
on news gathering created by grand jury subpoena was sufficient 
to override the "public interest in law enforcement."2 White 
thereby declined the opportunity to create a First Amendment 
privilege for newsmen seeking to shield their sources, a privilege 
not available to other citizens. 
Dwight D. Opperman Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Opperman In-
stitute of Judicial Administration. NYU School of Law. Professor Estreicher clerked for 
Justice Powell during the 1977-78 Term. 
** Graduate of the Class of 2009. New York University School of Law and author 
of Powe/ling for Precedent: "Binding'' Concurrences. N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. (forth-
coming 2009). 
We are not offering here an overall assessment of Justice Powell's jurisprudence. 
Such ground has been well tread. See, e.g .. Paul W. Kahn. The Court, the Community and 
the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell. 97 YALE L.J. 1. 9 (1987) (criti-
cal of Powell's "representative balancing"): William D. Bader. The Jurisprudence of Jus-
tice Powell, Jr .. in GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE 
STUDIES. 305-{)8 (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds .. 1993) (generally 
supportive of Powell's approach): Jacob W. Landynski. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Bal-
ance Wheel of the Court, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 
311 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds .. 1991) (noting that Powell was "the 
justice most often in the majority in close 5-4 decisions throughout the 1980s). Our focus 
is somewhat narrower-only on an aspect of his jurisprudential role: his ability to influ-
ence the path of the law through his concurrences. · 
I. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Henry L. Spraug (Jan. 26. 1900) (on file 
with the Library of Congress). available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/ 
at0052as.jpg. 
2. Branz burg v. Hayes. 408 U.S. 665. 690 ( 1972). 
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While joining the majority opinion, Justice Powell also 
penned a short separate concurrence to "'emphasize ... the lim-
ited nature of the Court's holding."' Attempting to cabin the 
Court's opinion to the facts of the case, Powell proposed a case-
by-case balancing test that would take into account the First 
Amendment interests as well as the public interest in ensuring 
truthful testimony during grand jury inquiries. Powell agreed 
with White that bad-faith prosecutions seeking information from 
the press would not be tolerated, but went further, stating that 
"'the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances 
where legitimate First Amendment interests require protec-
tion."~ 
Despite his having joined a majority opinion that seemingly 
rejected the creation of a First Amendment newsmen's privilege. 
Powell's separate opinion actually spurred recognition of a 
'"qualified reporter's privilege" in many subsequent lower court 
cases.' Many of these courts reasoned that because Powell cast 
the "'deciding" vote to create the majority, his analysis stands as 
that of the Court." 
True to his role as a vital center of the Court, Branzburg 
was not the only case where Justice Powell took steps to cast the 
majority opinion in a different, more restrained light. Indeed, 
Powell often preferred a short concurring opinion as the means 
of expressing his differences with a majority rationale. While 
many of his contemporaries may have preferred the clarity of a 
dissent, Powell sought both agreement and the benefits of signal-
ing a potentially limiting rationale in future cases by simultane-
ously purporting to join the majority rationale, while often stat-
ing what he saw as the "limited nature" 7 of the holding, or why 
the Court was right in "this case."~ 
Embracing one's differences in a concurring opinion is cer-
tainly not the only way a Justice can approach those differences. 
Dissents are. of course, a good deal more common. A dissent can 
3. /d. at 709 (Powell. J.. concurring). 
4. /d. at 710. 
5. See, e.g .. In re Selcraig. 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (construing Branzburg 
as a plurality opinion. and finding a qualified privilege); Zenrilli v. Smith. 656 F.2d 705 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (limiting Branzburg to the criminal context and explaining that Powell's 
test should govern in the civil context); Riley v. City of Chester. 612 F.2d 708. 715-16 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (noting that Powell cast the deciding fifth vote in Branzburg and adopting his 
test for a journalist's privilege). 
6. Zenri/li. 656 F.2d at 711. 
7. Branz burg. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell.J.. concurring). 
8. South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364.376 (1976) (Powell. J.. concurring). 
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aim at two different goals. First, a Justice may dissent along the 
lines of Justice Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson, noting that the 
Court had made a grave error in approving "separate but equal" 
laws and urging future decisionmakers to hold such laws incon-
sistent with the Constitution." In this way. the Justice implores a 
future jurist or lawmaker to find that the decision of the day was 
wrong and that a different result should be reached. Harlan 
proved prescient by the time of Brown v. Board of Education.w 
Second, a Justice may write a passionate dissent-a geshrei 11 
of sorts-aimed at arousing public interest in the issue and hope-
fully spurring a popular response to the Court's seemingly obvi-
ous mistake. This can be done either for the purpose of securing 
congressional action, as may have been Justice Ginsburg's goal 
in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 1' or to prompt con-
stitutional amendment as Justice Iredell's words in Chisholm v. 
Georgia 13 led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. Such 
opinions are often described as "passionate'' and may be seen as 
''chastising" the majority for its decision on the particular issue. 
This approach cannot be used in every case of disagreement be-
cause its effect depends on the probability of securing a popular 
response and it requires a weighing of the costs of diminishing 
political capital with one's colleagues. 
Typically, where a Justice joins the majority opinion, it is 
the majority, and not the concurring, opinion. that constitutes 
precedent for future decisions. Of course. where there is a rule 
there is an exception, and this rule is, well, no exception. Pow-
ell's concurrence in Branzburg is one example, but so, too, is 
Justice Robert Jackson's famous concurrence in The Steel Sei-
zure Case/ 4 or Justice Felix Frankfurter's concurrence in Brown 
v. A/len. 1' So naturally, this is not a new phenomenon-rare, 
perhaps, but certainly not new. 
9. Plessy v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537. 559. 564 ( 1896) (Harlan. J.. dissenting). 
10. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
11. Yiddish for a kind of emotional outburst. 
12. 127 S. Ct. 2162. 2178 (2007) (Ginsburg. J.. dissenting). Congress amended the 
antidiscrimination laws to implement Justice Ginsburg's criticism. See Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009. Pub. L. No. 112-2. 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
13. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419. 429 (1793) (Opinion of Iredell.J.). 
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579. 635-38 (1952) (Jack-
son. J.. concurring). Jackson concurred both in the judgment of the Court and in the 
opinion of the Court penned by Justice Black. 
15. 344 U.S. 443. 488. 73 S. Ct. 437 (1953) (Opinion of Frankfurter. J.). Justice 
Frankfurter concurred in Justice Reed's lead opinion. but only insofar as it addressed the 
effects of a denial of certiorari on a future federal district court's consideration of an ap-
plicant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He dissented from the rest of Reed's opin-
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What is unusual about Justice Powell, however, is the fre-
quency with which he utilized the approach. Over the 1975-1980 
period, Powell wrote 91 concurring opinions. Of those concur-
ring opinions, twelve, or roughly 13.2%, were invoked by later 
courts as stating the holding of the Court. Of his contemporary 
brethren, Powell had the largest number of concurrences, and 
the highest ratio of concurrences to dissents-evincing his clear 
preference for establishing his differences in a concurring opin-
• 16 
lOll. 
The chart below shows the breakdown of Powell's prefer-
ence for concurrence as compared with his peers: 
Opinion and Voting Trends in the Suprem! Court Term; 1975-1980 
Opinions Written Dissenting Votes Joining Majority 
Justice Of the CourtConcurrillj! Dissent C/D ratic Total Opinion Mem. Total W / o opinion %joined 
Bladcrnun 81 8- -3 1.192 241 124 33 15" 61- -1.6611 \1 
Brennan 82 52 122 0.426 256 282 63 345 464 53.89' " 
Burger 93 45 41 1.098 F9 16 5 21 -95 92.33" ,, 
Douglas• () 1 1 l.(J(J(J 2 2 1 3 - -
- -----·----
~l:mhall 84 30 108 o.rs 222 282 59 341 491J 56.91"·• 
Powell 89 91 "4 1.230 254 1111 26 126 644 -4.&J',, 
Rchnqu1st 91 36 w- Ll.336 234 201 66 26" 558 64.81" ,, 
Sten:ns -6 -2 124 0.581 n n 61 231 555 64.46",, 
Ste-.1·arr 9(1 46 86 0.535 222 155 34 189 626 -2.-l"n 
\\hire 91 49 -o u.-oo 210 124 32 156 656 -6.19"" 
Per Curiam 84 - - - 84 - - - - -
Total 861 509 806 - 21"6 1456 380 1836 - -
•Jusoa:: Douglas retired due to illness on :\orember 12, 19"5. Bec!use he cast a mte in onlrfourcases dunng 
the 19-5 Term, his statistic; are ignored for pmposes of mmparison to J ustia:: Powell during the 19-5-1981.1 Terms. 
A Justice can either concur in both rationale and judgment 
with the majority, or just in the judgment, before they write 
separately. The concurrence rate mentioned above includes both 
categories. The more interesting instances are naturally where 
the Justice signs on to the majority opinion in both judgment and 
ion. 
16. Powell concurred 91 times and dissented 74 times. giving him a ratio of 1.230. 
Justice Blackmun was the next closest. concurring 87 times and dissenting 73 times. for a 
ratio of 1.192. The statistics used for these numbers were compiled from the Harvard 
Law Review"s Annual Supreme Court Review and encompassed the 1975 through 1980 
Terms. beginning with 90 HARV. L. REV. 56. 276-82 (1976) through 95 HARV. L. REV. 
91. 339-45 (1981 ). 
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rationale, but then concurs in a separate opinion, and-a Ia 
Branz burg- that separate opinion is read by later courts to es-
tablish the binding rationale. 
THE VARIETIES OF JUSTICE POWELL'S INFLUENCE 
1. CONCURRING WITH THE MAJORITY AND WRITING 
SEPARATELY 
Powell's Branzburg opinion stands out as perhaps the most 
striking example of where despite joining the majority's opinion. 
a Justice's concurrence has been viewed with precedential 
weight in the subsequent decisions of the lower courts. But there 
are others. 
One characteristic of Justice Powell's jurisprudence is his 
preference to "balance'' competing interests in constitutional 
cases.
17 This concern for "balance" came through in Branzburg, 
and also later in Kelley v. Johnson. 1x In the latter case, ruling on a 
challenge to a county's ordinance regulating the grooming stan-
dards for its police force, Justice Rehnquist for the Court stated 
that while there was a constitutional interest at stake, the chal-
lenger bore the burden of showing that there was no rational re-
lationship between the ordinance and the public interest in po-
lice safety. In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted 
that "no negative implication ... with respect to a liberty interest 
within the Fourteenth Amendment'' could be found in the ma-
jority s opinion, and that "there must be a weighing of the de-
gree of infringement of the individual's liberty interest against 
the need for the regulation. " 1 ~ 
Courts in at least three circuits have cited with approval 
Powell's "no negative implication" language in cases dealing 
with regulations aimed at personal grooming standards. In Doe 
v. Houston, the court stated that "Justice Powell's concurring 
opinion in Kelley is the view shared by this Court, that 'no nega-
tive implication' as to the more general liberty interest in per-
sonal appearance is to be drawn from the Kelley majority opin-
ion. "20 Similarly, the Second Circuit stated that Powell's Kelley 
17. William D. Bader. The Jurisprudence of Jusrice Powell. Jr .. in GREAT JL'STICES 
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: RATINGS AND CASE STL:DIES 305-08 (William D. Peder-
son & Norman W. Provizer eds .. 1993). 
18. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). 
19. !d. at 249 (Powell. J.. concurring). 
20. 489 F. Supp. 76.80 (S.D. Tex. !980). 
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concurrence "reinforces the view we share that 'no negative im-
plication' as to the more general liberty interest in personal ap-
pearance" arises from Rehnquist's opinion. 21 There, the court 
undertook a rather lengthy balancing approach, exploring "the 
individual interests at stake" and "the state's countervailing in-
terests" before reaching the conclusion that the challenged ordi-
nance was "one of those purposeless restraints to which Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan referred." 22 The Northern District of Georgia has 
similarly employed Powell's balancing approach in Nalley v. 
Douglas County, invoking Powell's "no negative implication'' 
language and finding a regulation on the facial hair of roadside 
workers ''so unconnected to any legitimate state goal'' that it was 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff in a§ 1983 action. 21 
Interestingly. Kelley was decided by a vote of 6-2; thus, 
Powell's vote was not necessary to the formation of a majority, 
as it was in Branzburg. Some lower courts nevertheless referred 
to Powell's position as "casting the deciding vote" as a basis for 
their adoption of his reasoning.24 This is a testament to Justice 
Powell's influence, whatever the merits of the underlying reason-
ing of the lower courts. 
Powell's vote in Herbert v. Lando was similarly not neces-
sary to create a majority opinion." Decided by a 6-3 margin, 
Lando addressed whether press protection was available under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments during the discovery 
process when a member of the press was sued for defamation. 
Justice White's opinion for the Court flatly refused to recognize 
First Amendment limitations to discovery of the editorial proc-
ess. By contrast, Justice Powell, concurring, stressed that in ap-
plying the rules of discovery, the trial judge should take into ac-
count the First Amendment interests of the press in 
"measur[ing] the degree of relevance required in light of both 
the private needs of the parties and the public concerns impli-
cated."'" Noting a concern that the discovery process could be 
21. East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of East Hartford. 562 F.2d 838. 
841 (2d Cir. 1977). 
22. /d. at 846 (internal citation omitted). 
23. 498 F. Supp. 1228. 1230 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
24. See, e.g .. Riley v. City of Chester. 612 F.2d 708. 716 (3d Cir. 1979). 
25. Herbert v. Lando. 441 U.S. 153. 154 (1979). Justice White's majority opinion 
gained the votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun. Rehnquist. and Stevens. in 
addition to Powell. Thus. even if Powell had chosen to dissent. the case would have stood 
with a 5-4 majority supporting White's opinion. 
26. /d. at 179 (Powell. J.. concurring). 
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abused in libel cases against the media. Powell urged courts to 
supervise the process against the risk of abuse. 
Even though Powell's vote was not necessary to the Lando 
majority, his balancing approach has carried the day. In a defa-
mation suit against Merrell Dow. the D.C. Circuit remanded part 
of the appeal to the district court, urging it to limit discovery "to 
the extent feasible to those questions that may sustain summary 
judgment." In so doing, the court noted Powell's Lando concur-
rence and the district court's "duty to consider First Amendment 
interests as well as the private interests of the plaintiff. "2- N u-
merous district courts have similarly relied on Powell's concur-
rence. The district court for the Southern District of New York 
noted that "we must carefully balance the plaintiffs' interest in 
the requested discovery with the First Amendment interests 
sought to be protected."2' In denying a plaintiffs request for an 
order compelling the appearance of the AFL-CIO in a deposi-
tion, the district court for the District of Columbia noted that 
"the first amendment interests delineated in . . . Herbert v. 
Lando ... compel denial of plaintiffs discovery request. "2y The 
court noted that the inquiry into the political activities of the 
AFL-CIO would impinge on the organization's First Amend-
ment interests, and that counseled against a finding that their 
appearance would be relevant in discovery. 
Powell took care to preface his opinion in Lando by stating 
that "I do not see my observations as being inconsistent with the 
Court's opinion."30 This gloss may have encouraged lower courts 
to adopt his position in evaluating the relevance of certain dis-
covery requests. Interestingly. the conflict between the majority 
and Powell in Lando was similar to the conflict in Branzburg: in 
each case, the majority rejected the application of any absolute 
First Amendment privilege against inquiry into certain press ac-
tivities, and in each case, Powell noted that the First Amend-
ment interests should be taken into account in the appropriate 
balance. 
Also decided by a 6-3 margin was Monell v. Department of 
Social Services, addressing municipal liability under what is now 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, initially enacted as part of the 1871 Civil Rights 
27. McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharms .. Inc .. 717 F.2d 1460. 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1983 ). 
28. Rosario v. New York Times. Co .. 84 F.R.D. 626.631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
29. Walther v. Fed. Election Comm·n. 82 F.R.D. 200. 202 (D.D.C. 1979). 
30. Lando. 441 U.S. at 177-78 (Powell. 1.. concurring). 
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Act. 31 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, revisited the 
Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape regarding municipal immu-
nity to suit arising from § 1983 violations. Concluding that the 
Monroe Court had misread the legislative history surrounding 
the enactment of § 1983, Brennan concluded "that Congress did 
intend municipalities and other local government units to be in-
cluded among those persons to whom § 1983 applies."32 Under 
the majority's rationale, municipalities could be held liable for 
their policy decisions but could not be held liable for actions of 
its agents in violation of those policies. 
Possibly concerned that the majority had left the door open 
to a Bivens-type implied cause of action against municipalities 
that would not be limited to policy decisions, Justice Powell 
wrote a concurrence addressing this concern. First roundly ap-
proving of the Court's examination of the legislative history and 
its narrowing of the reach of Monroe, Powell went on to address 
"the question whether we should, by analogy to our decision in 
Bivens, imply a cause of action directly from the Fourteenth 
Amendment which would not be subject to the limitations con-
tained in § 1983. ,,, Noting that a factor in the inquiry would be 
whether. in the absence of congressional authorization of mu-
nicipal liability, persons injured by the unconstitutional official 
policies of a city would need the backstop provision of some 
other remedy, Powell tried to preempt judicial recognition of an 
implied cause of action in addition to § 1983 liability by suggest-
ing that a Bivens-type action against municipalities could not co-
exist with § 1983 municipal liability. Thus, he stated: "Rather 
than constitutionalize a cause of action against local government 
that Congress intended to create in 1871, the better course is to 
confess error and set the record straight, as the Court does to-
day. "3-l 
Here, too. the Powell concurrence has influenced the path 
of the law, as lower courts, picking up on its reasoning, have 
made reference to the availability of § 1983 municipal liability as 
an important factor counseling against a constitutional cause of 
action. Directly following Justice Powell's rationale in Monell, 
the federal court for the District of Vermont dismissed a plain-
tiffs cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment against a 
31. 436 U.S. 658.660 (1978). 
32. !d. at 690 (emphasis deleted). 
33. !d. at 712 (Powell. J .. concurring) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
34. !d. at 713. 
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municipality because the plaintiff had already established a 
cause of action under § 1983. The court noted that although the 
question was not squarely presented for decision in Monell, Jus-
tice Powell's concurrence addressed the contention. Similarly the 
Second Circuit has followed Powell's guidance.'' as have district 
courts within the First Circuit.'h 
In each of these cases, Powell purported to join the majority 
opinion in full- both its judgment and rationale- and yet chose 
to write a separate opinion to preserve his view of the issues. 
Moreover, Powell's vote here was not necessary to create a 
"Court," as contrasted with Branzburg. 
2. A "NARROW-GROUND" CONCURRENCE IN THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
Plurality opinions were a rare thing in the early history of 
the Supreme Court-so rare, in fact, that fewer than forty-five of 
them were handed down between 1800 and 1956.37 Since then, 
they have become a fairly frequent occurrence. complicating the 
ability of lower courts and practitioners to determine what a ma-
jority of the Justices had agreed on in a particular case. The 
Court tried to give some direction to the lower courts in Marks 
v. United States, where it stated that in the plurality context ''the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrow-
est grounds."'~ In such an instance, if no five-Justice majority of 
the Court agrees on one point of law, and one Justice files a con-
35. Ohland v. City of Montpelier. 467 F. Supp. 324. 348 (D. Vt. 1979) (citing prece-
dent of the Second Circuit in Turpin v. Maliet. 591 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1979). and of the 
Fourth Circuit in Cale v. City of Covington. 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978)). 
36. See Leite v. City of Providence. 463 F. Supp. 585. 587-88 (D.R.I. 1978) (noting 
that Powell had "mentioned that little reason now existed for resorting to a Bivens-type 
cause of action"): DeVasto v. Faherty. 479 F. Supp. 1069. 1071 (D. Ma. 1979) (reading 
Powell's concurrence in Monell to supplement the First Circuit decision in Kotska v. 
Hogg. 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977). and granting summary judgment to dismiss the plain-
tiffs constitutional claim). But see DiMaggio v. O'Brien. 497 F. Supp. 870. 876 (E.D. Pa. 
1980) (describing Powell's rejection of a constitutional cause of action against a munici-
pality as dictum. and expressing concern for the gap created by a rejection of both re-
spondeat superior liability and constitutionalliabilitv). 
37. John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds. Ju~idical Cripples: Pluralitv Opinions in 
the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59. 60 (1974) (citing Comment. Supreme Court No-
Clear Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis. 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99.99 (1956)). The 
Chicago Law Review Comment does not cite to any authority for this proposition. but 
the Davis and Reynolds article refers to the Comment as "an analytical study of plurality 
decisions ... /d. at 60 n.l. 
38. Marks v. United States. 430 U.S. 188. 193 ( 1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia. 428 
U.S. 153. 169 n.15 (1976) (Opinion of Stewart. Powell. and Stevens. JJ.)). 
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curring opinion that is logically narrower than any of the other 
opinions, the narrower opinion is seen to carry the "holding" of 
the Court. Such an approach gives undeniable weight to the Jus-
tice who authors the concurring opinion which proves to be nar-
rower. Not surprisingly, the author of the Court's opinion in 
Marks was Justice Powell. 
The "narrowest-grounds" approach has attracted some 
criticism, even from the Court itself. 19 However, much of that 
criticism seems to stem from the fact that it has been applied in 
situations in which the concurring opinion is not truly "nar-
rower"' than its companion plurality opinion. 
One example of Powell's impact via application of the "nar-
rowest-grounds" approach was in Robbins v. Ca/ifornia.4() Writ-
ing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Stewart laid down a 
bright-line rule that any warrantless search of containers found 
in an automobile was per se unreasonable. Powell, concurring in 
the judgment, declined to join in the formulation of the bright-
line rule, instead claiming that a court should determine whether 
or not the defendant had "manifested a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the contents of the container. "41 Powell listed a set 
of factors that would be relevant to this inquiry, and rejected the 
plurality's bright-line rule as merely promoting simplicity at the 
expense of Fourth Amendment protections. 
Because Robbins was a 4-1-1-3 decision (Chief Justice Bur-
ger concurred in the judgment without opinion), there was no 
governing rationale on which five Justices agreed. When the 
Second Circuit was confronted with the container-search issue in 
United States v. Martino. it invoked the ''narrowest-grounds" ap-
proach of Marks to construe the holding of Robbins. Although 
the Court had never fully explained what was meant by ''nar-
rowest-grounds," the appeals court interpreted it "as referring to 
the ground that is most nearly confined to the precise fact situa-
tion before the Court, rather than to a ground that states more 
general rules."4' Thus, because Powell's opinion could reasona-
bly be construed as "narrower'' than the plurality's-a rule hold-
ing that this container could not validly be searched being nar-
rower than a rule holding that no container could validly be 
searched-the Second Circuit adopted his reasoning as the true 
39. See, e.g .. Nichols v. United States. 511 U.S. 738.745-46 (1994). 
40. 453 U.S. 420 (1981 ). 
41. /d. at 434 n.3 (Powell. J.. concurring in the judgment). 
42. United States v. Martino. 604 F.2d 860.872-73 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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holding of Robbins.~' The Texas Court of Appeals has taken a 
similar line of reasoning in finding Powell's approach to be the 
binding force behind Robbins.~ 
Powell was able to retain influence through his concurring 
opinions even when he did not join the majority, and, in fact, 
even when the "narrowest-grounds" approach would have been 
technically inapplicable. Take, for instance, his opinion in Gold-
berg v. United States.~' Justice Brennan authored the opinion for 
the Court which interpreted a provision of the Jencks Ad" as 
creating a per se rule requiring an in camera examination of 
prosecutorial notes made during the pre-hearing interview of a 
witness in every case where it was requested. Justice Powell, 
concurring in the judgment, expressly disagreed with this part of 
the majority opinion, noting that "had the trial judge ruled that 
Newman's testimony was insufficient to justify further inquiry, 
rather than relying on the 'work product' privilege, I would have 
affirmed the denial of Goldberg's motion."~7 Instead, Powell 
claimed, the defendant must meet a threshold burden of provid-
ing "probative evidence" showing that he is entitled to the 
statements under the Act before a trial judge should grant any 
motion for production. 
Although Brennan's opinion was joined by seven Justices, 
and Justice Powell's opinion garnered only the assent of Chief 
Justice Burger, lower courts have relied on his refusal to require 
an in camera hearing in every instance. The Fourth Circuit, in 
United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Coopera-
tive Association, Inc., cited at length a passage in Justice Powell's 
Goldberg concurrence, and then noted that "an in camera in-
spection is not per se required."~ There, the court found relevant 
the fact that no basis had been established for production of the 
notes, and that to allow an in camera inspection "would be akin 
to sanctioning a fishing expedition. "~9 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit 
has held that an in camera inspection is not required in every 
case where a Jencks Act issue arises, citing as one reason Pow-
43. /d. at 873. 
44. See Adams v. State. 634 S.W.2d 785. 792 n.4 (Tex. App. 1982). 
45. 425U.S.94(1976). 
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970). 
47. Goldberg. 425 U.S. at 117 (Powell. 1 .. concurring in the judgment). 
48. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 22748 at *34 (4th Cir. Sept. 15. 1992). 
49. /d. at * 35. 
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ell's concern that to do so would be to sanction the delay of the 
trial for resolution of unnecessary collateral issues."' 
* * * 
The foregoing shows Justice Powell's consistent use of con-
curring opinions as a conduit for differentiation from majority 
opinions. This history shows the wisdom of soft judicial power-
that at least some Justices may be able to achieve greater influ-
ence by limiting the scope of disagreement with the majority 
rather than writing for a broader audience. This was certainly 
the approach (and which enhanced the influence) of Justice 
Powell. We have described six Powell concurrences that have 
been treated by lower courts as stating the holding of the Court, 
even where Powell's vote was not necessary to form a majority. 
In another piece, one of us has shown that nearly 15% of the 
concurring opinions Powell authored during the 1975-1980 
Terms were used by later courts as stating the effective holding 
of Supreme Court precedent.'1 This is an aspect of Justice Pow-
ell's jurisprudence that remains understudied and underappreci-
ated in the legal community, and suggests useful lessons for 
members of the present Court. 
50. United States v. Osgood. 794 F.2d 1087.1091-92 (5th Cir. 1986). 
51. Tristan Pelham-Webb. Powelling for Precedent: "Binding" Concurrences. 
N.Y.U. ANN. SL·R. AM. L. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1 n.8. on file with author). 
